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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court properly find that Megabar's 
processor and processing method constituted wrongful use of 
IRECO1s trade secrets? 
2. Did the trial court properly enjoin Megabar from 
continued use for a limited period of time of a processor and 
processing method that are similar to and based upon misappro-
priated trade secrets? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a decision of the Third 
District Court (the "trial court"), in which the trial court 
granted Plaintiff IRECO Incorporated1s ("IRECO1s") request for an 
injunction against Defendants1 use of a processor and processing 
method that were developed from secret technology misappropriated 
from IRECO. This matter was initially brought against Megabar 
Corporation, Megabar Explosives Corporation, Western Brine 
Research Laboratory and M. Taylor Abegg (collectively referred to 
herein as "Megabar") for misappropriation of trade secrets and 
tortious interference with the nondisclosure and noncompetition 
provisions of an employment contract. R. at 2. The trial court 
denied Megabar!s Motion for Summary Judgment. Minute Entry dated 
February 25f 1986, unindexed. The case was then tried before the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya. 
-1-
The trial court ruled that Megabar intentionally and 
tortiously induced the breach of a former IRECO employee's 
employment agreement. R. at 1137, 1142; Ad, at II-7, 11-8 NS 
11-12. The trial court also ruled that Megabar misappropriated 
IRECO's trade secrets related to formulations of "cast explosive 
compositions" and equipment (the "processor") that IRECO had 
developed for making them. 2d. In consequence, the trial court 
ordered Megabar to license certain patent rights concerning the 
formulations to IRECO, and the trial court enjoined Megabar for a 
limited period of time from using, licensing, or selling cast 
explosive compositions, methods for making them, or equipment for 
making them. R. at 1128; Ad. at III-l et seq. The trial court 
concluded that the compositions, methods and equipment described 
in the injunction were based on IRECO1s trade secret technology. 
R. at 1138; Ad. at 11-12. 
The trial court ordered that the length of the injunc-
tion and the issue of damages be tried at a subsequent hearing. 
R. at 1143. These issues were settled by the parties, however, 
and pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the trial court 
entered an injunction lasting for a period of two years and two 
months from the date of entry of the injunction. R. at 1123; Ad. 
at III-l. Subsequently, the injunction was stayed as to the 
processor, conditioned on the posting of a bond by Megabar and 
pending resolution of this appeal. R. at 1236. 
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This appeal was initially taken from the first entry of 
judgment. R. at 1212. This appeal has subsequently been limited 
to the injunction as it pertains to the processing equipment and 
methods. Mgabar has chosen not to contest the trial court's 
findings or remedies in any other respect. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts involved in this case are as follows. 
A. Development of Cast Explosive Compositions Tech-
nology. 
"Cast explosive compositions" are a new class of 
explosives that were developed by IRECO. R. at 1460. Research 
concerning cast explosive compositions was performed principally 
by an IRECO employee, a research chemist named Harvey Jessop. R. 
at 1461. Jessop was first employed by IRECO in 1963; he was 
induced by Megabar to leave IRECO in August, 1983. R. at 2298; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 001040; Ad. at VIII. Jessop began working 
for Megabar on or about August 23, 1983. Id. 
Concurrently with the development of cast explosive 
compositions, Jessop, with others at IRECO, developed a machine 
for continuous processing of cast explosive compositions. R. at 
1926. This experimental equipment, which was virtually complete 
when Jessop left IRECO, was called a "cast emulsion unit." R. at 
1945, 1665; Plaintiff's Exhibit 16; Ad. at XI. 
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By 1982, IRECO recognized that cast explosive composi-
tions would be useful for certain applications that traditionally 
required explosives such as TNT. R. at 1469-1472, 1479-1486, 
1491-1499, 1504. IRECO began to develop and market these new 
compositions for military applications, primarily through the 
efforts of another IRECO employee, defendant M. Taylor Abegg. R. 
at 1715-24, 1726, 1760. 
B. Defendant Abegg's Employment at IRECO. 
Abegg was first employed by IRECO in the early 1970s. 
R. at 1711-1713. He was re-employed by IRECO in 1981. Id. His 
job responsibilities included the marketing of IRECO products and 
technology to the military. R. at 1712, 1729. By 1983, Abegg 
was Director of Government Operations for IRECO, responsible for 
marketing IRECO products to the military. R. at 1712. In his 
positions at IRECO between 1981 and 1983, Abegg became intimately 
familiar with IRECO1s cast explosive composition formulations and 
equipment. R. at 1725, 1729-1730. Abegg even assisted Jessop in 
manufacturing cast explosive compositions in the spring of 1983. 
R. at 1736-1738. 
C. Formation of Megabar. 
In early 1983, Abegg became dissatisfied with what he 
apparently considered to be IRECO1s lack of appreciation of his 
contributions and difficulty with a supervisor. R. at 1754-55. 
By February, 1983, Abegg had decided to leave IRECO, but he did 
not advise anyone at IRECO of his decision. R. at 1751, 1755. 
Thus, for about four months he continued to have access to secret 
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developments in cast explosive compositions technology at IRECO 
even after he had decided to leave IRECO. _Id. See also R. at 
1734-35. 
In the summer of 1983, Abegg had discussions with Jay 
W.,Butler, former General Counsel of IRECO, and John A. Peterson 
of Morton Thiokol. R. at 1762, 2046. During these discussions, 
Abegg disclosed that IRECO was working on cast explosive compo-
sitions. R. at 1762, 1765-67, 1777-79, 1781-82. On August 3, 
1983, Abegg, Butler and Peterson formed a new corporate entity to 
market explosives technology, including cast explosive composi-
tions technology. R. at 2296. Abegg resigned from IRECO in 
early August, 1983, promising to protect IRECO1s trade secrets. 
R. at 1768. He immediately joined Megabar. 
D. Jessop*s Departure from IRECO and Employment at 
Megabar. 
Abegg and Butler were soon joined by Harvey Jessop. R. 
at 2298. Abegg knew of Jessopfs dissatisfaction with work and 
safety restrictions before Abegg left IRECO. R. at 1766-68. 
Jessop was hired at a Megabar subsidiary called Western Brine 
Research, in part in an effort to disguise his association with 
Megabar. R. at 2106. 
Jessop had entered into an employment contract with 
IRECO on October 15, 1976. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1000027; Ad. at 
V. The contract provided that (1) Jessop would not compete with 
IRECO or assist others in competing with IRECO for two years 
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after terminating his employment; (2) Jessop would not disclose 
IRECO's proprietary information; and (3) any invention made by 
Jessop which related to his work at IRECO would belong to IRECO 
unless Jessop could prove independent development. _Id. 
Abegg and Butler were well aware of the provisions of 
Jessopfs contract. R. at 1767. Indeed, Jay W. Butler had 
drafted the contract while serving as General Counsel of IRECO. 
Notwithstanding the agreement, Megabar 'hired Jessop and immedi-
ately put him to work on cast explosive compositions under the 
direction of M. Taylor Abegg. Plaintiff's Exhibit 001040. 
E. Status of Cast Explosive Compositions at IRECO in 
August, 1983. 
By the time Abegg and Jessop left IRECO, IRECO had 
developed several workable formulations of cast explosive compo-
sitions and had conducted extensive research on them. R. at 
1548-80. Work was nearly completed on the cast emulsion unit, 
and it was ready for testing. R. at 1572, 1948. Jessop had 
reviewed draft patent applications on cast explosive composition 
formulations and had suggested changes. R. at 1586. 
F. Megabar's Exploitation of Cast Explosive Composi-
tions. 
From the first, Megabar claimed cast explosive compo-
sitions technology as its own. Even before any lab work had been 
carried out, Megabar was offering to license cast explosive com-
positions technology. R. at 1777-79, 1784. By February, 1984, 
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after only four months of lab work, Megabar filed three patent 
applications on cast explosive composition formulations. R. at 
1809, 2310-38, 2068-75. Although the Megabar patent applications 
included two other types of explosive compositions, Megabar 
toyted cast explosive compositions (denominated in Megabarfs 
patent applications as Method 2) as the most useful of the three 
methods described. See Plaintiff's Exhibits 000480, 000460 and 
000424. See also R. at 1777-79, 1784> 1853-62, 1864-76, 1878, 
1884-89. While Megabar was rushing to file its patent applica-
tions, Harvey Jessop delayed and broke appointments to review and 
sign IRECO's patent applications. R. at 1809-15. Jessop finally 
appeared at IRECO the day after Megabarfs attorney, Kay Cornaby, 
flew to Washington, D.C. to file Megabarfs applications. R. at 
1809-15, 2115. 
G. The Continuous Processor. 
Megabar built a processor for continuously manufactur-
ing cast explosive compositions. R. at 2222. Although Megabar1s 
witnesses claimed that John Peterson and others developed 
Megabarfs processor independently of IRECO's, R. at 2228, there 
was a great deal of evidence to the contrary. See, e.g. , R. at 
1918-53, 2043-2103. Abegg and Jessop were both intimately 
familiar with the IRECO processor. R. at 1924-25, 1955, 1944-50. 
In fact, Jessop telephoned IRECO after he joined Megabar to find 
out whether the IRECO processor was working. R. at 1951. 
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John Peterson and Clyde Lindeman (Megabar witnesses) 
testified that Harvey Jessop proposed a processor design at 
Megabar that was rejected. R. at 2232-39,2252-54. Even if that 
testimony is taken at face value, however, it is of little sig-
nificance. The rejected proposal differed significantly from the 
IRECO processor. The rejected proposal, for example, used a 
different mechanism to heat the ingredient reservoirs. R. at 
2224. 
In contrast to the rejected "Jessop model," the IRECO 
cast emulsion unit and the processor that Megabar touted as its 
own had the same important features that are described in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 16. R. at 2080, 2225; Ad. at XI. (Because 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 describes proprietary information, its 
substance is not discussed herein in detail. The Exhibit is set 
forth in full in the Addendum to this brief. The Addendum, as 
explained in the Table of Contents, is separately attached to 
this brief to preserve the secrecy of certain materials that are 
contained in the Addendum.) Differences between the Megabar and 
IRECO processors related mainly to the type of pump used and to 
operation of the Megabar machine by a control mechanism that was 
not included in the IRECO processor. Compare R. at 2180 and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3000073 with R. at 2226, 2232-33. 
H. Megabar's Patent Applications. 
In August, 1984 Megabar filed two patent applications 
that related to the processor. R. at 2239; Plaintiff's Exhibits 
001275 and 001292; Ad. at IX and X. The apparatus or processor 
-8-
application describes a device or piece of equipment that allows 
ingredients to be continuously mixed to make compositive explo-
sives. Plaintiff's Exhibit 001292; Ad. at X. The process is 
carried out without interruption, instead of in discrete batches. 
R.^at 2220. Megabar's method patent application simply describes 
in more general terms what the apparatus or machine does, rather 
than describing the machine itself. Plaintiff's Exhibit 001292, 
at 001293; Ad. at IX-3. Therefore, the IRECO and Megabar 
processors both used the "method" described in Megabar's method 
patent application. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 16; Ad. at XI. 
The Megabar patent applications claimed as patentable 
(i.e., as new or novel) the same elements that were embodied in 
the IRECO processor as described above. _Id. These patent 
applications, which named Peterson and Abegg as inventors, were 
signed under oath. See R. at 1815-18. Thus Megabar declared 
that the devices described in the applications met the statutory 
patent requirements for novelty. Later Megabar abandoned its 
patent applications, pursuant to a Stipulation of the parties, in 
lieu of licensing them to IRECO. R. at 1233-34. 
Contrary to representations in Megabar's Brief, 
Megabar's brief at 12-13, Megabar presented no evidence at trial 
that the IRECO processor was known elsewhere in the industry. 
Megabar relies on two citations for a contrary assertion in its 
brief. One citation, Megabar's Brief at 13, is to the testimony 
of John Peterson, wherein he agreed that continuous processes are 
"the kinds of machines that . . . [he] had experience with" 
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during the time he worked at Thiokol. R. at 2220. The second 
citation, Megabar's Brief at 13, is to an Affidavit signed by 
Megabarfs patent attorney. Megabar filed the affidavit with the 
trial court on September 20, 1985, some three months after trial 
and two months after the trial court issued its Memorandum Deci-
sion. The affidavit was not introduced by Megabar during the 
trial, and should not be considered as trial evidence by this 
Court. 
I. Megabarfs Marketing of the Processor. 
From the time of its formation until the trial, Megabar 
attempted to market cast explosive compositions and the proces-
sor. Entities to whom disclosures were made and to whom market-
ing overtures were made included other major explosives manufac-
turers and aerospace companies. R. at 1777-79, 1784, 1853-62, 
1864-76, 1878, 1884-89; Ad. at XII, XIII and XIV. 
Agreements involving significant amounts of money were 
entered into for cast explosive composition technology, including 
one submitted as Exhibit 000711 at trial. See also Exhibit 
000566 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 20. One agreement with Aerojet-
General Corporation, Exhibit 000711, Ad. at XIII, which Megabar 
admitted was based primarily on the other party's interest in 
cast explosive compositions technology, netted Megabar a sub-
stantial capital payment and license payments. See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 000711 at 000714; Ad. at XIII-3. 
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Based on all of the foregoing and all of the evidence 
presented at trial, the trial court made the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
7. IRECO, through research and development 
extending over several years and expen-
diture of substantial sums of money, has 
developed commercially valuable trade 
secrets and confidential information 
concerning the research, development, 
formulation, manufacturing processing of 
certain castable explosive compositions 
that were characterized by IRECO as 
"cast explosive compositions." . . . As 
developed by IRECO by 1983, cast explo-
sive compositions and related manufac-
turing equipment constituted a signifi-
cant improvement over the prior art and 
were a valuable commercial asset of 
IRECO. . . . 
10. In connection with the development of 
cast explosive compositions, Jessop also 
devised and built a type of a continuous 
processor which was designed so that 
cast explosive compositions could be 
safely and continuously mixed and manu-
factured as opposed to being manufac-
tured in batches. The processor was 
essentially complete and ready for trial 
runs by August of 1983 when Jessop left 
IRECO. 
13. by August of 1983, the development of 
the cast explosive compositions and the 
continuous processor at IRECO, together 
with IRECO's marketing plans, consisted 
of a compilation of knowledge and 
information, including plans, formulas, 
processes, and devices, which was not 
generally known in the explosives 
industry and which constituted a com-
mercial advantage to IRECO over 
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competitors. No one other than IRECO 
was at that time working with cast 
explosive compositions. 
At the time that Jessop joined Western 
Brine Researchf Butler, Jessop and Abegg 
were all aware of Jessop1s employment 
with IRECO. Jessop and Abegg were aware 
that IRECO regarded its cast explosive 
compositions formulations and its con-
tinuous processor as proprietary trade 
secret information. 
Thereafter, Abegg, Butler and others at 
Megabar induced and allowed Jessop to 
disclose IRECO1s trade secrets and 
confidential information to Megabar and 
to work on cast explosive compositions 
and a continuous processor based on that 
developed at IRECO. Jessop continued to 
work on cast explosive compositions at 
Western Brine Research, and Jessop and 
Abegg disclosed IRECO1s trade secrets 
and confidential information to persons 
at Western Brine Research and Megabar. 
Without notice or consent of IRECO, 
Megabar, through Western Brine Research, 
immediately commenced work on both cast 
explosive composititons and the prepa-
ration of a continuous processor. . . . 
Megabar has filed patent applications 
concerning methods and apparatus for the 
continuous production of composite 
explosives. The claims in Megabar1s 
applications are anticipated by the 
processor developed at IRECO. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
IRECO1S information and technology con-
cerning cast explosive compositions and 
the continuous processor constitute 
trade secrets which are the property of 
IRECO. 
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8. IRECO has suffered and will continue to 
suffer irreparable harm for which there 
is no adequate remedy at law, and is 
entitled to an immediate injunction 
prohibiting Defendant's, their officers, 
agents, employees, assigns or anyone 
acting in concert or participation with 
them, from researching, developing, 
disclosing, selling, licensing or using 
in any way cast explosive compositions 
and related technology, including 
equipment, for a term of years to be 
determined at further hearing. 
R. at 1132-1142; Ad. at II-2 to 11-12. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Contrary to Megabar1s assertions, there was more than 
adequate evidence at trial to support the Court's finding that 
Megabar benefitted substantially from IRECO1s processor and con-
tinuous processing method. There can hardly be any dispute that 
the processor and processing method were trade secrets because 
Megabar submitted patent applications for a machine and a con-
tinuous processing method that embodied the name elements. In so 
doing, Megabar represented under oath that the subject matter of 
the patent applications was patentable, i.e., novel. That 
Megabarfs machine benefitted from IRECO1s was to be inferred from 
the similarities of the processors, particularly as described in 
Megabarfs patent applications. Megabar cannot dispute that the 
alleged inventions were valuable—Megabar made substantial 
amounts of money on the processor. Indeed, its many disclosures 
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of IRECO* s technology in its marketing efforts is one of the 
injuries suffered by IRECO. 
In addition to the foregoing, the trial court found 
that Megabar tortiously induced an IRECO employee to breach his 
employment agreement and the trial court found that the agreement 
was reasonable and enforceable. This alternative ground for 
relief does not depend on the trade secret status of the proces-
sor and provides sufficient basis for the relief accorded IRECO 
by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
MEGABAR WRONGFULLY OBTAINED AND USED IRECO1S 
TRADE SECRET APPARATUS AND METHODS FOR MAKING 
CAST EXPLOSIVE COMPOSITIONS. 
A. The Trial Court's Order Should Not 
Be Disturbed Unless the Evidence 
Clearly Preponderates Against Its 
Findings. 
As Megabar has indicated, findings of the trial court 
should not be modified unless a clear preponderance of the evi-
dence in the record requires it. Abbott v. Christensen, 660 P.2d 
254, 257 (Utah 1983); Brown v. Lovelandf 678 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 
1984). In equity cases like the present onef it is strongly 
presumed that the findings in the judgment entered below are 
correct. Ovard B. Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1979). This rule 
is based on this Court's recognition of the advantaged position 
of the trial judge, who sees and hears the witnesses and is able 
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to weigh their credibility. Dang v. Cox Corp. , 655 P. 2d 658 
(Utah 1982); Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981). As the 
argument and discussions below demonstrate, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that the Megabar processor 
and processing method substantially benefitted and were derived 
from IRECO's trade secrets. 
B. IRECO' s Continuous Processing 
Method and Processing Equipment 
Were Trade Secrets. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the elements of a 
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation as follows: 
(1) possession of knowledge or information 
not generally known (i.e., the secret); and 
either (2) his communication of the secret to 
the defendant under an express or implied 
agreement limiting its use or further dis-
closure, and the defendant's use thereof in 
violation of the confidence, to the injury of 
the plaintiff; or (3) the defendant's acqui-
sition of the secret by some wrongful manner 
and the use thereof to the plaintiff's dam-
age. 
Microbiological Research Corp. v. . Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-698 
(Utah 1981) (citation omitted). More recently, the court has 
defined trade secrets in J & K Computer Systems v. Parrish, 642 
P.2d 732 (Utah 1982), as follows: 
A trade secret includes any formula, patent, 
device, plan or compilation of information 
which is used in one's business and which 
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advan-
tage over competitors who do not know it. 
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Id, at 735f citing Restatement of Torts Section 757, comment b 
(1939). 
The evidence at trial showed that IRECO1s cast emulsion 
unit and continuous processing method (hereinafter referred to as 
"processing technology") were secret, i.e., not generally known 
in the industry. See, e.g., R. at 2220. IRECO witnesses testi-
fied that continuous processing of the type embodied in the IRECO 
processor was not generally known. 
The only evidence that Megabar cites to the contrary is 
the statement by several witnesses that continuous processing of 
explosives was well known in the industry. That is not the 
issue, here, however, because IRECO does not claim that all con-
tinuous processing of composite explosives is IRECO1s trade 
secret. At issue in this appeal is whether a processsor with the 
specific combination of components possessed by the IRECO pro-
cessor was generally known in the industry. There is no evidence 
to indicate that IRECO1s processor was a "standard" model, as 
Megabar suggests, and the evidence is to the contrary. Megabar's 
argument is analogous to stating that because automobiles are 
known, there can be no trade secrets relating to developments of 
a particular automobile design. 
Megabar also relies in its Brief on evidence it pro-
duced three months after the trial and eight days after the 
Findings of Fact and Injunction were entered. See R. at 1187. 
Even if the evidence stands for the proposition for which it is 
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asserted, it was not introduced at trial and is not part of the 
record on appeal. 
The best evidence of the trade secret status of the 
IRECO processing technology is that Megabar filed patent appli-
cations that pertained to the same type of device and methodology 
that IRECO had developed. To do sof the alleged inventors of 
Megabar1s technology, John Peterson and Taylor Abegg, had to sign 
the applications under oath, indicating that they believed the 
subject matter described in the applications met the statutory 
requirement for novelty, among other things. The language of the 
injunction as it applies to the apparatus and method closely 
tracks the language of the Megabar patent applications. Compare 
Injunction, Ad. at III, with Plaintiff's Exhibits 001279 and 
001292; Ad. at IX and X. Thus, the injunction covers no more 
than the subject matter that Megabar claimed, under oath, as 
novel. If Megabar previously claimed under oath that the pro-
cessing technology was not generally known, Megabar should now be 
estopped from claiming the contrary in this appeal. 
It is a well-recognized principle of trade secret law 
that trade secrets do not require the same level of novelty as 
patents. 1 Milgrim, Milqrim on Trade Secrets, § 2.08[3] at 2-146 
(1986). Thus, the fact that Megabar filed patent applications 
covering the same device and methods that were embodied in 
IRECO1s processor is an admission that the concepts embodied in 
the patent applications were of sufficient novelty to qualify for 
trade secret status. See 1 Milgrim, Milqrim on Trade Secrets 
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§ 2.08[3] at 2-146 to 2-153 (1986). As the court stated in 
Carter Products v. Colgate Palmolive Co.f 130 F. Supp. 557 (D. 
Md. 1955)f aff'd, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 352 U.S. 
843 (1956): 
[T]he contention that [the] information was 
previously known in the trade is clearly 
inconsistent with [defendant] Colgate's 
filing . . . patent applications, covering 
the same subject matter. 
See also 1 Milgrim, Milqrim on Trade Secrets S 2.08[1] at 2-139 
(1986). (An invention of sufficient novelty for patent protec-
tion is entitled "a fortiori"to protection as a trade secret). 
Megabar argues that its processor was different from 
IRECO1s and better engineered. However, Megabar was not seeking 
to patent the elements that distinguished its processor from 
IRECO's. The claims of Megabarfs patent applications are not 
limited to specific types of pumps; they do not even mention the 
unique control mechanism. To the contrary, the elements of the 
processor and processing technology that Megabar attempted to 
patent were the same as those that was developed at IRECO. These 
similarities were illustrated during the trial in Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 16, Ad. at XI, which juxtaposed the claim language from 
the Megabar patent applications with the description of the cast 
emulsion unit and the processing method that were developed at 
IRECO before Jessop and Abegg left. Indeed, without the relief 
granted by the trial court, Megabarfs patents, if granted, would 
have excluded IRECO from using its own continuous processing 
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method or cast emulsion unit to make cast explosive compositions. 
See 35 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. It is not relevant to this appeal 
that IRECO has chosen not to try to continue to try to patent the 
processor as a trade secret, thus avoiding public disclosure of 
the processor that a patent would involve. 
Moreover, even if Megabar's characterization of its 
processor as an improvement is correct, the fact does not excul-
pate it from liability for misappropriation. The majority and 
better reasoned authority holds that even if defendants have made 
improvements on a plaintiff's trade secrets, the use of the 
improvements can be enjoined. 2 Milgrim, Milqrim on Trade 
Secrets § 7.07[1] at 7-164 (1986). 
Additionally, under Utah law, Megabar's claimed inven-
tion need only be substantially similar to IRECO1s processing 
technology. In J & K Computer Systems v. Parrishy 642 P.2d 732, 
a more recent Utah case than Muna, this Court upheld an injunc-
tion against the use of a computer program that was similar but 
not identical to the plaintiff's program. J & K Computer Sys-
tems , 642 P.2d at 734-735. "Defendant need not appropriate every 
feature of plaintiff's trade secret to be a wrongful user; sub-
stantial appropriation is actionable . . . and is analogized by 
some courts to the patent law determination of 'equivalents.' 
Moreover, moderate modification by defendant of plaintiff's trade 
secret will not act as an insulation against an allegation of 
wrongful use." 2 Milgrim, Milqrim on Trade Secrets section 
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7.07[1], at 7-162 to 7-164, n.63 (citing J & K Computer Systems) 
(citations omitted). 
To make another analogy, the situation in this appeal 
can be compared to the rule in patent law that where a device 
accused of infringement embodies all of the elements of the pat-
ent claim, additional elements in the accused device will not 
preclude a finding of infringement. See D. Chisum, Patents 
§ 16.02[1] at 16-7 (1986). In other words, applying that rule by 
analogy to the present case, the addition of a special control 
mechanism to the processor does not change the fact that the 
processor itself embodies IRECO1s trade secrets. Thus, Megabar 
was properly enjoined from continued use of the processor and the 
processing method. 
C. Megabarfs Processor and Processing 
Method Were Based on IRECOfs Tech-
nology. 
The evidence at trial showed that the Megabar processor 
and processing method incorporated and were based upon IRECOfs 
technology. Jessop and Abegg were intimately familiar with the 
IRECO cast emulsion unit before they left IRECO. The principals 
of Megabar had complete access to Jessop even while he was at 
Western Brine Research. 
Abegg1 s and Jessop1 s behavior was like that of the 
classic "surreptitious employee" that is discussed in 1 Milgrim, 
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Milqrim on Trade Secrets § 5.04[3] at 5-129 to 5-130 (1986) 
(citations omitted) as follows: 
Not uncommonly, when an employee plans to 
appropriate his employer's trade secrets, 
plans are laid to do so not by disclosure to 
a third party, such as an existing or 
potential competitor, but rather through the 
creation of a corporation in which the 
defaulting employee or employees will have an 
ownership interest. Judging from the large 
number of cases in which trade secrets have 
been taken by employees for use in a business 
formed by them, one could construct a corre-
lation between the desire to be on one's own 
and the temptation to "borrow" one's 
employer's property to achieve that end. 
Surreptitious employees share certain habit 
patterns. They "plot" with other employees 
who appear to be discontent. They stay in 
the corporation, gather information that will 
be of value, all the while going through the 
formalities of creating a corporate 
vehicle. . . . Then one or more of the 
plotters quits, often leaving other plotters 
behind to keep an eye open for new 
developments which might be of use to the 
newly formed competitor. The courts do not 
tolerate this kind of double-dealing by the 
employee, the guise of the independent cor-
poration is penetrated in cases where it 
appears that the corporation is the alter ego 
of such employees. 
See also 2 Milgrim, Milqrim on Trade Secrets S 7.08 at 7-178 to 
7-202 (1986) (citing numerous cases supporting injunctive relief 
when a "surreptitious employee" has injured his employer). 
Most salient on the issue of misappropriation are the 
similarities of the Megabar processor and processing method, as 
described in the Megabar patent applications, to IRECO's pro-
cessing technology. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 16. In contrast to 
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this evidence, Megabar offered only the self-serving testimony of 
its own employees who stated that John Peterson developed the 
Megabar processor independently, after rejecting Jessopfs 
unworkable proposal. The rejected Jessop model differed signif-
icantly from both Megabar's and IRECO1s machines. The Megabar 
and IRECO machines, however, were quite similar. Additionally, 
Abegg was intimately involved in designing the Megabar machine. 
He also was familiar with the IRECO processor, and Jessop dis-
cussed IRECO's processor with Megabar employees. R. at 1974-75. 
All of the facts support the trial court's conclusion that 
Megabar1s technology was borrowed from and based upon IRECO's. 
Whether or not Jessop made a processor proposal to 
Megabar, the trial court was entitled to infer from the evidence 
that Jessop's and Abegg's knowledge of the IRECO processing 
technology were used at Megabar in developing its processor. As 
this Court has often stated, the trial court is in a particularly 
advantageous position to see and hear the witnesses and weigh 
their credibility. The trial court apparently drew the obvious 
conclusion from the IRECO's evidence and should be accorded due 
deference in weighing that evidence against the credibility of 
the Megabar witnesses. Certainly, it cannot be said that the 
evidence in the record clearly preponderates against the trial 
court's finding on this issue. 
It does not matter whether Peterson or anyone else at 
Megabar might have developed a processor based on information 
obtained elsewhere when the evidence is clear that they did not 
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do so. It is an established rule of law that wrongful use of 
information previously obtained in confidence is subject to 
injunctive reliefr even if the information "could have been 
independently developed or ascertained." 2 Milgrim, Milqrim on 
Trade Secrets § 7.08[2] (1986). "What is protected, then, is the 
integrity of the secret disclosure made in a protected relation-
ship, rather than the invention itself." Id. In other words, 
because Megabar obtained information about IRECO1s processing 
technology and used it in its own processor, it is irrelevant 
whether Megabar might have developed the information from other 
sources. Jeter v. Associated Rack Corporation, 607 S.W.2d 272 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980), writ ref. n.r.e., cert. den. 454 U.S. 965 
(1981); General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Frederick, 50 Misc. 2d 
994; 272 N.Y.S. 2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1966) mod, den. 52 Misc.2d 197, 
274 N.Y.S.2d 634, 152 U.S.P.Q. 524 (1966); Riteoff v. Contact 
Industries, Inc. 43 A.D. 2d 731, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 690, 181 U.S.P.Q. 
330 (1973). 
D. IRECO*s Processing Technology was 
Valuable. 
Looking further to the requirements for trade secret 
protection, the evidence at trial was overwhelming that the IRECO 
apparatus and processing method were valuable. Megabar success-
fully marketed a processor containing the same elements (and 
implicity utilizing the same method) as the IRECO processor. 
Additionally, Megabar had the benefit of trial-and-error 
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experimentation that was conducted at IRECO, which Jessop 
inquired about after going to work for Megabar. Finally, the 
value of IRECO1s technology is confirmed by Megabarfs 
protestations that it cannot make any of its composite explosives 
without the processor. 
E. IRECO Was Injured by Megabar's 
Activities. 
There was more than adequate evidence at trial to show 
that IRECO sustained sufficient injury to support a trade secret 
cause of action. Although Megabar chooses to ignore the evi-
dence, Megabarfs misappropriation of IRECO technology, including 
its processing technology, at a minimum gave Megabar a consider-
. . . 2 
able headstart in the military explosives market. 
Additionally, there were numerous disclosures of 
IRECO1s trade secrets to Megabar!s prospective customers. These 
disclosures could not be called back once they were made. The 
disclosures have clouded IRECOTs ownership of the technology it 
1 In fact, Megabar protests too much. Megabar could use batch 
methods, even if less convenient. The latter are not limited to 
"mixing with a broomstick," as Megabar suggests. See Megabarfs 
Brief at 15. 
2 Megabar admitted as much in its post-hearing brief in support 
of a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issues of damages and 
length of the injunction. R. at 1306, 1309-1310, 1312-1315. 
Megabarfs Motion was denied and the issues were settled. See 
Judgment dated March 21, 1986, and Stipulation dated March 20, 
1986, unindexed. 
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had developed, an intangible but nonetheless real injury to IRECO 
that is akin to loss of business goodwill. 
What Megabar suggests is that technology that is in the 
developmental stages and for which no lost sales opportunities 
are shown cannot receive trade secret protection. The suggestion 
misstates the law. Other courts have held that precommercial 
uses of trade secrets are entitled to the same protection as 
commercial uses. 1 Milgrim, Milqrim on Trade Secrets § 2.02[1] 
at 2-19 (1986). The essential element is value, which can hardly 
be disputed here. See J & K Computer Systems, 642 P.2d at 735. 
It is clear that IRECO was injured by Megabar1s misappropriation 
of IRECO1s processing technology. Megabarfs arguments to the 
contrary are not persuasive. 
F. Megabar is Not Entitled to Use 
Misappropriated Technology for 
Other Purposes. 
The evidence shows that development of the processing 
technology at IRECO and at Megabar was inextricably bound up with 
cast explosive compositions. The need for more sophisticated 
continuous processing techniques provided the impetus for devel-
opment of the IRECO processor. R. at 1977, 2227. While Megabar 
claims that the processor can be put to other uses (i.e., Methods 
1 and 3), there is no question but that most of Megabarfs work 
during the time it built its processor was concentrated on cast 
explosive compositions (Method 2) rather than Methods 1 or 3. 
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The law does not entitle a misappropriator to escape 
liability by diverting stolen technology to other uses. See 
generally 1 Milgrim, Milqrim on Trade Secrets SS 2.01 and 2.02 
(1986). This conclusion follows generally from the definition of 
a t^rade secret with respect to secret machinery or equipment. 
Secret machinery is entitled to trade secret protection, even if 
a misappropriator of the machinery puts the machinery to various 
uses. id. All uses of the processor embody IRECOfs trade 
secrets; therefore, Megabar has no right to put a processor 
developed with IRECOfs stolen technology to any use at all. 
Arguments to the contrary in Megabarfs Brief are unpersuasive. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD 
BECAUSE INDEPENDENT GROUNDS, NOT CHALLENGED 
BY MEGABAR IN THIS APPEAL, SUPPORT AND JUS-
TIFY THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF GRANTED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
A. A Trial Court Should be Affirmed 
When Alternative Grounds Support 
Its Decision. 
In addition to holding that Megabar wrongfully used 
IRECO's trade secrets relating to processing technology, the 
trial court found that Megabar intentionally and tortiously 
interfered with Harvey Jessopfs employment contract with IRECO. 
See Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 16, 17, 18, 21, 27, 28; Conclusions 
of Law Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8; Ad. at II-4 to 11-12. This alternative 
basis for the relief ordered by the court has not even been 
addressed by Megabar. 
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This Court has affirmed a trial court's decision when-
ever it can do so on a proper ground, even if such ground was not 
relied on by the trial court. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. 
Neeley Construction Company, 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984); Branch v. 
Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); Matter of 
Hock's Estate, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982). Clearly, if it is 
proper to affirm a trial court on proper grounds even when the 
trial court does not expressly rely on such grounds, it is even 
more compelling to affirm the trial court when, as in this case, 
the trial court has expressly relied upon alternative grounds 
that are not challenged in this appeal. Global Recreation, Inc. 
v. Cedar Hills Development Co., 614 P.2d 155 (Utah 1980). 
B. The Injunctive Relief Granted By 
the Trial Court Should be Upheld 
Because Defendants Intentionally 
and Tortiously Induced Jessop To 
Breach His Employment Contract. 
After hearing all of the testimony and argument at 
trial, and after reviewing a copy of Harvey Jessop1s employment 
contract with IRECO, admitted as Pis. Ex. 1000027 (Ad. at V), the 
trial court concluded as a matter of law, based upon the 
evidence, that "Harvey Jessop1s employment contract was reason-
able and enforceable." (R. at 1142; Ad. at 11-12.) That con-
tract contained a restrictive covenant as follows: 
7. Employee further agrees that 
improper disclosure of any of the information 
listed in paragraph 6 above and/or use 
thereof could be highly detrimental to 
Employer. Therefore, Employee agrees that 
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for a period of two (2) years after termina-
tion of such employment he will not either 
for himself or for others then Employer 
engage in any business competitive with 
Employerfs business, including but not lim-
ited to the developing, making, selling and 
using of explosives. 
There is no question that Jessop violated this provi-
sion, with the knowledge of and at the inducement of Megabar. It 
is also commonly held that knowingly hiring an employee in vio-
lation of a prior noncompetition agreement states a cause of 
action for tortious interference with contractural relations, and 
that this is true regardless of whether the contract is later 
held to be enforceable against the employee. 1 Milgrim, Milqrim 
on Trade Secrets S 5.04[4], at 5-133 to 5-134, n. 39 citing, 
inter alia, Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc., 481 S.W.2d 934, 
938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), rev'd on other issues, 449 S.W.2d 87 
(Tex. 1973) (fact that defendant employed plaintiff employees 
knowing they were subject to covenants not to compete showed 
malice and justified exemplary damages). Because this indepen-
dent basis of liability exists unchallenged by Megabar, the trial 
court's decision must be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the assertions of Megabar, there is more 
than ample evidence in the record to support the trial court's 
finding that IRECO's processing technology was a trade secret and 
that Megabar wrongfully obtained and used that trade secret. 
Having so found, and also based on unchallenged alternative 
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grounds, the trial court properly awarded an injunction to 
deprive Megabar of the headstart wrongfully gained. The trial 
court's decision should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of September, 
198*6. 
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